Contrary to what you might have thought, not everything in the Bill of Rights applies against state and local governments. It’s only through a haphazard process called “selective incorporation” that the Supreme Court has determined which facets of the Bill of Rights apply to states — such as the 1st and 8th Amendments — and which do not, such as the 7th Amendment right to a trial by jury in civil cases whenever twenty dollars or more is at stake. And, similarly, a set of late-19th Century precedents (Cruikshank, Presser and Miller) held that the 2nd Amendment does not restrict states from passing their own restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms.
There has been an increasing amount of historical and legal scholarship that argues that this whole line of cases is wrong, starting with the Court’s opinion in The Slaughter-House Cases (1873) to strangle in the nursery the 14th Amendment’s newly-enacted protections of the privileges or immunities of all citizens, which was intended to federalize the protection of individual liberties in the wake of the Civil War. If accepted, these arguments — presented best in the Constitutional Accountability Center’s paper The Gem of the Constitution — would restore the original progressive intent of the 14th Amendment and the guarantees of all the Bill of Rights (as well as some group of unenumerated rights) against both federal and state action. Or, at a minimum, the Court could determine that the incorporation doctrine (via substantive due process) should apply to the Second Amendment.
[In the meantime, as you may recall, the Court held in its 2008 Heller decision that the Second Amendment does protect an individual right to bear arms as against federal restrictions, subject to qualifications the Court promised to sort out later.]
Which brings us to yesterday, an appeal of a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit regarding a Chicago gun control regulation, maintaining that no matter how poorly-reasoned they found the earlier Second Amendment cases, only the Supreme Court itself could overturn them and find the Second Amendment’s reach to extend to state and local laws. As Judge Easterbrook noted during oral argument, “I entirely appreciate your argument that the Slaughter-House Cases are wrongly decided. But as is often said in the bureaucracy, that’s above our grade level.”
But at this paygrade, the Privileges or Immunities argument just isn’t going to fly. Let’s go to yesterday’s transcript, with Alan Gura arguing on behalf of the gun owners:
JUSTICE SCALIA: No, no. I’m not talking about whether — whether the Slaughter-House Cases were right or wrong. I’m saying, assuming we give, you know, the Privileges and Immunities Clause your definition, does that make it any easier to get the Second Amendment adopted with respect to the States?
MR. GURA: Justice Scalia, I suppose the answer to that would be no, because -
JUSTICE SCALIA: Then if the answer is no, why are you asking us to overrule 150, 140 years of prior law, when — when you can reach your result under substantive due — I mean, you know, unless you are bucking for a — a place on some law school faculty -
(Laughter.)
MR. GURA: No. No. I have left law school some time ago and this is not an attempt to — to return.
JUSTICE SCALIA: What you argue is the darling of the professoriate, for sure, but it’s also contrary to 140 years of our jurisprudence. Why do you want to undertake that burden instead of just arguing substantive due process, which as much as I think it’s wrong, I have — even I have acquiesced in it?
The entire Court, it seemed, had problems with Gura’s attempt to assert that the Privileges or Immuntities Clause protected various unenumerated (i.e., not explicit) rights as understood at the time of the 14th Amendment. So, then, how do we determine the contours of a Second Amendment right as to state and local regulation via incorporation?



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